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Abstract
We examine the agent's investment level in a project with potential high-risk
consequences. In order to reduce uncertainty, the agent may acquire costly in-
formation. We ¯rst ¯nd that both a very optimistic agent (who thinks that the
damage has low probability to occur) and a very pessimistic agent never acquire
information because information is not valuable for them. Yet, with information,
the agent's investment is higher than the one he would make without. We then
show that information acquisition may be motivated by a lower cost of information
acquisition, a lower damage cost, higher marginal revenue and better information
precision.
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1Introduction
In their report, Tallon and Vergnaud (2005) indicate that it is crucial to understand
well how individual behaves when he may reduce the uncertainty in acquiring information.
For example, concerning the risk of GMO damage, it is interesting to learn when and
why a farmer prefers ignoring information and continuing his production while acquiring
information in order to predict how he reacts to changing of situations.
The European Council argues that innovation is one of the main areas of action
to achieve global competitiveness (Commission to the Council and al, 2006). Innova-
tions such as agro alimentary inputs (in particular, fertilizers) or new technologies are
often characterized by evolving information about their environmental and health con-
sequences. Innovators have limited initial knowledge when they have to decide whether
to invest in new chemical inputs such as fertilizers or pesticides. To reduce uncertainty
on the risk of damage, innovators may acquire information through an investment in re-
search. This naturally rises the question of the e®ect of the uncertainty reduction brought
by information on the level of investment and the cost of a potential accident. Does infor-
mation acquisition always lead to a higher investment? Does reducing uncertainty always
imply a lower damage size?
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) propose the pioneer decision model in a risk
context. Savage (1954) extends it to the uncertainty context. Recently, the economists
include information acquisition to these models. Arrow-Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974)
show that an agent adopts less often an irreversible decision (for example, cutting trees)
when he acquires information than when he does not. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) develop
a consumption model with hyperbolic discounting preferences involving a potential risk in
the long run. They ¯nd that individual may prefer ignoring information to avoid changing
his consumption path. Moreover, recent works on the individual's behaviour suggest
that the individual may neglect information asbestos, is an example. The adoption of
prevention measures were too costly than people preferred ignoring the information about
the asbestos risk on health. This ignorance strategy may also apply in an industrial
context. An investor may refuse to acquire information to avoid stopping his project.
That may lead to huge accident such as AZF (Toulouse, France) in 2001.
To go further in the analyse of the agent's behaviour, one must examine what deter-
mines his decision regarding activities for which scienti¯c knowledge is still incomplete.
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) propose the 'availability bias'. They suggest that
people undervalue or overvalue small probabilities in proportion to the importance of
potential damages and according to their past experiences. This is the core of the indi-
vidual's prior beliefs. In insurance, the prior beliefs modify clearly the decision of the
individual to subscribe or not to insurance against the risk (Kunreuther et al, 1978). So,
2the prior beliefs seem to have a real in°uence on the individual's choices. We may then
wonder what their e®ects are on the agents' decisions to acquire or not information when
he wants to undertake a risky project.
Moreover, the research cost and the information precision seem also a®ecting the
agent's decision to acquire information. Intuitively a high research cost may slow down
the acquisition of information because it decreases the expected payo®. The e®ect of the
information precision is less obvious since the individual may strategically ignore infor-
mation even if it gives him a better idea on the risk involved. Recently more information
about risk are available thank to data from previous accident (BARPI and al, 2005) or
to observation of new inputs adoption, or discussion with other innovators (McCardle,
1985, Wozniak, 1993, Gozlan and Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e, 2001). However, this information
is rarely perfect and the innovator has to make own research on the risk to improve the
precision.
We then propose a model in which an agent may both invest in a potentially dangerous
project and reduce his uncertainty on the project's risks by acquiring costly information.
He then has a choice between two strategies: refusing to acquire information and always
continuing his project, or acquiring information and stopping or continuing the project
according to the received signal.
We ¯nd that a very optimistic agent, a very pessimistic agent, and an agent receiving
a not very reliable information precision never acquire information because information
is not valuable for them. He always wants to continue his project. We note that with
information, the investment is higher than without. Moreover, we ¯nd that information
acquisition is motivated by a lower cost of information acquisition, a lower parameter
cost of accident, higher marginal revenue or better information precision if the agent is
optimistic. Hence, we detail all the agent's decisions, and we identify all factors a®ecting
the agent's choices in order to predict how the agent will react to changing of situation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the model. Section 2 studies
the optimal innovator's decisions. Section 3 analyses the e®ect of the prior belief, the
marginal revenue, the parameter cost of an accident, the cost of research and the precision
of information on the innovator's decisions. Section 4 presents an example. All proofs
are in appendix.
1 The model
We consider a three periods model in which an innovator chooses at period 0, an
investment in an project I ¸ 0 which may damage human health or the environment.
There are two states of the world: H and L. The probability that damage happens is
3µS with S 2 fH;Lg. Damage is more likely in state H than in state L which means that
µ
L < µ
H:
At period 0, the prior belief of the innovator is p0 on state H and 1¡p0 on state L. The
expected prior probability is then E(µ) = p0µH + (1 ¡ p0)µL.
At period 0, the innovator may invest C in research to obtain information at period
1, through a signal ¾ 2 fh;lg on the true state of the world. For simplifying, we consider
that C 2 f0; ¹ Cg with ¹ C a positive and given amount. If the innovator does not invest in
research, i.e. C = 0, he does not acquire information. However, if he invest ¹ C, he obtains
information on the risk of damage.
We de¯ne by f the information precision. The higher the information precision is,
the higher the probability that the signal indicates the true state of the world. So f is
such that
P(hjH) = P(ljL) = f and P(hjL) = P(ljH) = 1 ¡ f:
According to Bayes' rule
P(Hjh) =
p0f
p0f + (1 ¡ p0)(1 ¡ f)
and P(Hjl) =
p0(1 ¡ f)
p0(1 ¡ f) + (1 ¡ p0)f
:
We assume that the signal is informative, but not perfectly informative so
1
2
< f < 1:
The timing of the game is the following. At period 0, Nature draws the state of the
world, and the innovator chooses his investment I in the project, and whether he invests
or not in research. At period 1, he learns a signal ¾, and decides to stop or continue the
project. At period 2, an accident occurs or not.
We de¯ne by x the probability to continue the project. Since x depends on the signal,
for ¾ 2 fl;hg, x = x¾. By assumption, if the innovator stops the project at period 1, then
returns from the project are zero. If the project is continued until period 2, it returns a
payo®
R(I) = rI with r > 1:
To this payo® must be subtracted the cost of an accident
K(I) = kI
2 with k > 0
that occurs with probability µH or µL depending on the state of the world.
So at period 2, given a signal ¾ 2 fh;lg and the decision to stop (x = 0) or to continue
(x = 1) the project, the innovator's expected payo® is
V2(x;¾;I) = x[P(Hj¾)(rI ¡ µ
HkI
2) + (1 ¡ P(Hj¾))(rI ¡ µ
LkI
2)]:
4Since, at period 1 there is no payo®, the intertemporal expected payo® at period 1 is
equal to the one at period 2, thus:
V1(x;¾;I) = V2(x;¾;I):
Notice that the decision may depend on the value of the signal. Hence at period 0, the
innovator's expected payo® is
V0(xh;xl;I;C) = ¡I¡C+[p0f+(1¡p0)(1¡f)]V2(xh;h;I)+[p0(1¡f)+(1¡p0)f]V2(xl;l;I):
2 The optimal decision-making
The innovator takes three decisions: at period 0, he chooses his level of investment in the
project and whether he invests or not in research to obtain information; at period 1, he
learns the signal and decides whether he continues or stops his project.
2.1 Stopping or continuing the project
We ¯rst study the innovator's decision at period 1 to stop or to continue his project. At
period 1, the agent receives the signal ¾ 2 fl;hg and according to the signal, he chooses
to continue or to stop his project.
We de¯ne by E(µj¾) = P(Hj¾)µH + (1 ¡ P(Hj¾))µL the expected probability that a
damage happens when the innovator receives the signal ¾ 2 fh;lg. It is easily veri¯ed that
Lemma 1 E(µjl) · E(µ) · E(µjh).
Formally, the innovator continues his project if when he receives the signal ¾ 2 fl;hg
at period 1, the expected payo® of continuing the project is higher than the expected
payo® of stopping it, i.e.
V1(1;¾;I) > V1(0;¾;I):
This yields the following proposition
Proposition 1 For all signal ¾ 2 fl;hg, if I < r
kE(µj¾), the innovator's optimal decision
is to continue the project; and if I > r
kE(µj¾), the innovator's optimal decision is to stop
it.
According to Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we have three cases. First case, the inno-
vator always decides to stop his project, no matter whether he receives the signal h or l.
In this case, he never innovates. Second case, the innovator always decides to continue
his project, no matter whether he receives the signal h or l. So, he always innovates. And
third case, the innovator stops his project if he receives the signal h and if he receives
5the signal l, he continues it. He then does not innovate if he receives the signal h while
he innovates with the signal l.
2.2 Investment in the project and investment in research
Now, we analyse the innovator's decisions at period 0 to invest or not in the project and
to acquire or not information on the risk of damage through an investment in research.
According to the previous part, we have three cases.
First case means that xh = 0 and xl = 0. Hence at period 0, the innovator's expected
payo® is
V0(0;0;I;C) = ¡I ¡ C:
The innovator chooses his investment in research C¤
00 and his investment in the project
I¤
00 in order to maximize his expected payo®. Since V0(0;0;I;C) is decreasing with I
and for all I ¸ 0, V0(0;0;I;0) > V0(0;0;I; ¹ C), we immediately obtain that C¤
00 = 0 and
I¤
00 = 0. Then if the innovator anticipates that he always stops his project at period 1,
at period 0 he does not invest in research and he does not invest in the project to avoid
a negative payo®.
Second case means that xh = 1 and xl = 1. Hence at period 0, the innovator's
expected payo® is
V0(1;1;I;C) = ¡I ¡ C + rI ¡ E(µ)kI
2:
The innovator chooses his investment in research C¤
11 and his investment in the project
I¤
11 in order to maximize his expected payo®. The following lemma sums up the solutions.
Lemma 2 The innovator does not invest in research then C¤
11 = 0 and he chooses to
invest I¤
11 = r¡1
2E(µ)k in the project.
It is not surprising that the innovator does not invest in research since the signal does
not change his mind to stop or continue his project. However, he invests in the project
because r > 1 by assumption.
Third case means that xh = 0 and xl = 1. Then at period 0, the innovator's expected
payo® is
V0(0;1;I;C) = ¡I ¡ C + p0(1 ¡ f)(rI ¡ µ
HkI
2) + (1 ¡ p0)f(rI ¡ µ
LkI
2):
The innovator chooses his investment in research C¤
01 and his investment in the project
I¤
01 in order to maximize his expected payo®. It is implicit that the innovator invests
C¤
01 = ¹ C in research because he changes his mind according to the signal, he is then
informed on the risk of damage. We de¯ne by q = p0(1 ¡ f) + (1 ¡ p0)f the ex-ante
6probability of the signal l. Then I¤
01 is the solution of the next problem
max
I
V0(0;1;I; ¹ C):
The solution is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If qr · 1 the innovator does not invest in the project I¤
01 = 0 while if qr > 1,
he invests I¤
01 =
qr¡1
2qE(µjl)k.
The agent changes his mind by continuing or stopping the project according to the
information, then information is valuable for him. He then invests in research to obtain
it. However, he does not always invest in the project because his expected payo® may be
negative.
The innovator chooses the optimal investment in research C¤ and the optimal invest-
ment in the project I¤ in selecting the investment in research and the investment in the
project, which lead him to the highest expected payo®. Then we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 If
qr > 1; (1)
and E(µjl) <
(qr ¡ 1)2E(µ)
4qk ¹ CE(µ) + q(r ¡ 1)2 (2)
are satis¯ed then the innovator invests I¤ =
qr¡1
2qE(µjl)k in the project and C¤ = ¹ C in
research, otherwise if one of these conditions does not hold then the innovator invests
I¤ = I¤
11 and he does not invest in research, C¤ = 0.
Under conditions (1) and (2) the innovator decides to acquire information on the risk
of damages of his project. He stops his project, and then does not innovate and avoid the
accident if he receives the signal h while he continues his project if he receives the signal
l. However, if one of these conditions does not hold, he prefers ignoring the information
and continuing his project. This behaviour is not safe. For instance, if a laboratory
prefers ignoring the results of the tests and continuing to produce that may lead to a
huge damage on the health such as the contaminated blood.
We wonder how the acquisition of information and then the reduction of uncertainty,
a®ects the level of investment. We then compare the investment without information I¤
11
and the investment with information I¤
01.
Lemma 4 If conditions (1) and (2) are satis¯ed then the investment with information is
always higher than the investment without information.
7So according to Proposition 2, if conditions (1) and (2) hold the innovator invests in
research to acquire information. He then stops his project and avoids the accident if he
receives the signal h while if he receives the signal l, he continues it and since he chooses
a higher investment than without information the size of the damage increases.
3 The in°uences on innovator's behaviour
3.1 The impact of the prior belief
An innovator is optimistic (pessimistic) if he believes that the probability to be in state
H, the state where the damage is more likely, is lower than (higher than) 1
2, i.e. p0 < 1
2
(p0 > 1
2). So, the prior belief determines if an innovator is more or less optimistic.
Lemma 5 A higher prior belief increases the range of values in which the innovator stops
his project.
Actually, the more pessimistic the innovator is, the more he thinks that the probability
that a damage occurs is higher and the more he prefers stopping his project. Hence,
pessimism does not favour innovation.
Proposition 3 If the innovator is very optimistic (p0 = 0) or if he is very pessimistic
(p0 = 1) then he never invests in research to get more information on the risks of damage
and he invests I¤
11 in the project. His level of investment in the project is higher than the
level of investment he could undertake with information.
A very optimistic innovator believes that he is in the state where the damage is less
likely. Then for him, the information is not valuable and he prefers always continuing
his project. He does not invest in research to acquire information. On the other hand, a
very pessimistic innovator thinks that he is in the state where the damage is more likely,
information could lead him to stop his project, he then prefers not acquiring it. However,
a very optimistic and a very pessimistic innovator invest more in the project than if they
undertake with information. This behaviour imply an increase of the potential damage
on health or on the environment.
So, only innovators with intermediate prior beliefs may acquire information on the risk
of damage. They invest in research when the information is valuable for them, i.e. when
this information changes their mind accordingly, by continuing or stopping the project.
83.2 The impact of the marginal revenue and the cost parameter
of an accident
The marginal revenue of the project r and the cost parameter of an accident k are
included in the innovator's payo®. For a given investment, a higher marginal revenue
increases the payo®, while a higher cost parameter decreases it. The next proposition
sums up the e®ect of these parameters on the innovator's behaviour.
Proposition 4 A higher marginal revenue increases the range of values in which the
innovator continues his project and in which the innovator invests in research. In contrast,
a higher cost parameter decreases them.
So, with higher marginal revenue and/or a lower parameter cost, the innovator invests
more often in research to acquire information. Indeed, a higher marginal revenue and/or a
lower parameter cost imply a higher expected payo®. That creates an incentive to acquire
information and reduce the uncertainty on the expected payo® because the possibility to
stop the project is lower.
3.3 The impact of the cost of information acquisition and the
information precision
The cost of information acquisition and the information precision may a®ect the de-
cision of the innovator. Intuitively, the cost of information acquisition decreases the
motivation of the innovator to undertake research because it decreases the expected pay-
o®. On the other hand, the precision of the information may be an incentive to invest in
the research because this reduces the uncertainty on damage.
Proposition 5 A higher cost of information acquisition, i.e. investment in research,
decreases the range of value in which the innovator invests in research.
So a higher cost reduces the incentive of the innovator to invest in research and acquire
information on the risk of damage. If the cost is too high, it is obvious that the innovator
never acquires information because his payo® may become too low and even negative.
However, a low cost may encourage the innovator to invest in research and reducing the
uncertainty on his project.
Lemma 6 A higher information precision increases the range of values in which the in-
novator stops his project if he receives the signal h while if he receives the signal l, he
continues it.
The more precise the information is, the more it is informative on the true state of
the world and leads the innovator to change his mind according to the signal.
9Proposition 6 The innovator does not invest in research if the information precision
is not very reliable (f tends towards 1
2) and he invests I¤
11 in the project. His level of
investment in the project is higher than the level of investment he could undertake with
information. Moreover, if the innovator is optimistic, a higher information precision
increases the range of value in which the innovator invests in research.
It is not surprising that if the signal is not very reliable the innovator does not see
any interest to invest in research. This information is not valuable for him. Moreover,
the innovator decides a higher investment in the project than if he acquired information.
He then increases the damage size.
If the innovator is optimistic, he stops his project less often when he acquires infor-
mation than a pessimistic innovator. So a higher information precision motives him to
invest more often in research to decrease the uncertainty on the risk of damage.
So, only good precisions incentive the innovator to acquire information. The infor-
mation is then valuable for him. However, the innovator may decide to not acquiring
information even if the precision is almost perfect. He then ignores the information in
order to not change his behaviour.1
4 An example
We present an example. We represent
C1(p0) = qr ¡ 1 and C2(p0) =
(qr ¡ 1)E(µjh)
2qr
¡ E(µjl):
If C1(p0) and C2(p0) are positive then conditions (1) and (2) are satis¯ed and the innovator
invests in research ¹ C and he invests
qr¡1
2qE(µjl)k in the project. However, if one of these
equations is negative, the innovator does not invest in research and he invests I¤
11 in the
project.
We take an example with a good information precision, f = 0;95. The probability
that an accident happens in the state where the damage is more likely is µH = 0;8, so
if the innovator is in the state H, he has a high probability that an accident occurs. On
the other hand, he has a low probability than an accident occurs when he is in the state
L, µL = 0;1. We obtain the following ¯gure.
1The following example illustrates this.
10Figure 1: Innovator's behaviour with f = 0;95, r = 3, µH = 0;8, µL = 0;1, k = 1 and ¹ C = 0;5.
In Figure 1, we immediately note that if p0 = 0, C1(p0) is positive while C2(p0) is
negative and if p0 = 1, C1(p0) is negative while C2(p0) is positive. Then we verify that
if the innovator is very optimistic, or is very pessimistic, he does not invest in research
and he chooses to invest I¤
11 in the project. We then observe that the innovator invests
qr¡1
2qE(µjl)k in the project and invests in research when he has intermediate prior beliefs,
here C1(p0) and C2(p0) are positive when p0 is within 0:05 and 0:27. Above 0:27, C1(p0)
and/or C2(p0) are negative, the innovator does not invest in research anymore.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how the innovator behaves when he has the possibility to
acquire information in investing in research. We also investigate how innovator's prior
belief on the probability that damage happens, the cost of information acquisition, the
parameter cost of an accident, the marginal revenue and the information precision may
a®ect his behaviour.
We ¯nd that the innovator does not always decide to acquire information. He may
prefer ignoring it. Actually, when he is very optimistic or if he is very pessimistic, he never
acquires it. He is con¯dent on his belief, he does not want to revise it to avoid stopping
his project. Moreover, if the information precision is not very reliable, the innovator
does not have any interest to acquire information neither. For him, the information is
not valuable, he prefers not investing in research. However, when the information has a
11better precision, we ¯nd that the innovator may be motivated to acquire information, in
particular if he is optimistic.
The cost of information acquisition, the cost parameter of an accident and the marginal
revenue also a®ect the innovator's behaviour. These results are intuitive. With a lower
cost parameter and/or higher marginal revenue, the innovator stops less often his project.
That creates an incentive to acquire information and reduces the uncertainty on the ex-
pected payo®. On the other hand, a higher cost of information acquisition (research)
reduces the incentive of the innovator to invest in research and acquire information on
the risk of damage because that may lead to a negative payo®. However, a low cost of
research may encourage the innovator to invest in research and reducing the uncertainty
on his project.
We show that when the innovator decides to acquire information, he chooses a higher
investment in the project than the one he could undertake without information. So, if he
receives the signal h, he stops his project and he avoids the accident while if he receives
the signal l, he continues it and since he invests more in the project, the size of the
damage on health or on the environment increases. In the greenhouse e®ect context, our
result may be pervert. In choosing to invest in research, acquire the information and so
to reduce the uncertainty on the potential damages of his project, the agent decides to
pollutes more than without information.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For p0 2 [0;1], since µH > µL and f > 1
2 we obtain that
E(µjl) ¡ E(µ) =
(1 ¡ p0)p0(µH ¡ µL)(1 ¡ 2f)
(1 ¡ p0)f + p0(1 ¡ f)
· 0
and
E(µ) ¡ E(µjh) =
(1 ¡ p0)p0(µL ¡ µH)(2f ¡ 1)
p0f + (1 ¡ p0)(1 ¡ f)
· 0:
Thus, E(µjl) · E(µ) · E(µjh).
¥
12Proof of Proposition 1
At period 1 the innovator receives the signal ¾ 2 fh;lg. He chooses to continue if
V1(1;¾;I) > V1(0;¾;I) which is equivalent to I <
r
kE(µj¾)
:
¥
Proof of Lemma 2
The innovator may invest or not in research then C 2 f0; ¹ Cg. So ¯rst, we consider C as
given and we look for the investment in the project which solves
max
I
V0(1;1;I;C): (3)
We verify that problem (3) is concave. Then we di®erentiate twice times V0(1;1;I;C)
with respect to I. We obtain
¡2E(µ)k
which is negative. Then problem (3) is concave.
We then look for the investment I which maximizes the innovator's expected payo®. So
I is characterized by
r ¡ 1 ¡ 2E(µ)kI = 0 which is equivalent to I =
r ¡ 1
2E(µ)k
:
Second, we study whether the innovator invests or not in research. We then compare
V0(1;1;I; ¹ C) and V0(1;1;I;0). We obtain that
V0(1;1;I; ¹ C) < V0(1;1;I;0)
because ¹ C is positive. Then the innovator does not invest in research.
¥
Proof of Lemma 3
The signal is informative because the innovator changes his mind by continuing or stop-
ping his project according to the signal. Then implicitly he invests ¹ C in research.
We look for the investment in the project which solves
max
I
V0(0;1;I; ¹ C): (4)
13We verify that problem (4) is concave. Then we di®erentiate twice times V0(0;1;I; ¹ C)
with respect to I. We obtain
2k[¡p0(1 ¡ f)µ
H ¡ (1 ¡ p0)fµ
L]
which is negative. Then problem (4) is concave.
We then look for the investment I which maximizes innovator's expected payo®. So I is
characterized by
qr ¡ 1 ¡ 2qE(µjl)kI = 0 which is equivalent to I =
qr ¡ 1
2kqE(µjl)
:
Thus, if qr · 1 the investment I is negative, then the innovator does not invest in the
project. If qr > 1, the investment I is positive and the innovator chooses to invest I in
the project.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Optimally, the innovator chooses the investment in research and the investment in the
project which lead him to the highest expected payo®.
We compute the three expected pro¯ts with respect to the innovator's decisions. We
obtain
V0(0;0;I
¤
00;C
¤
00) = 0 and V0(1;1;I
¤
11;C
¤
11) =
(r ¡ 1)2
4E(µ)k
and
if qr · 1 then V0(0;1;I
¤
01;C
¤
01) = ¡ ¹ C and if qr > 1 then V0(0;1;I
¤
01;C
¤
01) =
(qr ¡ 1)2
4qkE(µjl)
¡ ¹ C:
We then compare these pro¯ts. First, we compare V0(0;0;I¤
00;C¤
00) and V0(1;1;I¤
11;C¤
11).
Since r > 1, we always obtain V0(0;0;I¤
00;C¤
00) < V0(1;1;I¤
11;C¤
11). Then the innovator
chooses to invest I¤
11 in the project and he does not invest in research.
Second, we compare V0(0;1;I¤
01;C¤
01) and V0(1;1;I¤
11;C¤
11). If qr · 1, since r > 1, we
always obtain that V0(0;1;I¤
01;C¤
01) < V0(1;1;I¤
11;C¤
11). However, if qr > 1, we obtain
V0(0;1;I
¤
01;C
¤
01) > V0(1;1;I
¤
11;C
¤
11) is equivalent to E(µjl) <
(qr ¡ 1)2E(µ)
4qk ¹ CE(µ) + q(r ¡ 1)2:
(5)
14So, if qr · 1 the innovator chooses to invest I¤
11 in the project and he does not invest
in research. If qr > 1 and if second part of equation (5) is satis¯ed then the innovator
invests
qr¡1
2kqE(µjl) in the project and he also invests ¹ C in the research to acquire information.
In contrast, if qr > 1 and if second part of equation (5) is not satis¯ed then the innovator
invests I¤
11 in the project and he does not invest in research.
¥
Proof of Lemma 4
We then compare the investment with information and the investment without informa-
tion. If conditions (1) and (2) are satis¯ed then we have
V0(0;1;I
¤
01;C
¤
01) > V0(1;1;I
¤
11;C
¤
11) which is equivalent to (qr ¡ 1)I
¤
01 ¡ (r ¡ 1)I
¤
11 > 2 ¹ C:
Since ¹ C > 0 and q < 1 then I¤
01 > I¤
11.
¥
Proof of Lemma 5
According to Proposition 1, with the signal ¾ 2 fh;lg, the innovator stops his project if
I > r
kE(µj¾). We have
@E(µjh)
@p0 =
(1¡f)f(µH¡µL)
(1¡q)2 and
@E(µjl)
@p0 =
(1¡f)f(µH¡µL)
q2 which are positive.
So r
kE(µj¾) is decreasing with p0. Thus, a higher prior belief increases the range of values
in which the innovator stops his project.
¥
Proof of Proposition 3
We study how the prior belief a®ects conditions (1) and (2). We ¯rst analyse the case in
which the innovator has his prior belief equal to zero (he is very optimistic). We obtain
that E(µjl) = E(µjh) = E(µ) = µL and q = f.
Condition (1) is written as
fr > 1:
Condition (2) is written as
µ
L <
(fr ¡ 1)2µL
4fk ¹ CµL + f(r ¡ 1)2 which is equivalent to 4fk ¹ Cµ
L + (fr
2 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ f) < 0:
15Since fr > 1 implies that 4fk ¹ CµL + (fr2 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ f) > 0 then condition (2) does not
hold. So the innovator does not invest in research and he invests I¤
11 in the project.
We compare I¤
01 and I¤
11. If fr · 1 then I¤
01 = 0 < I¤
11. And if fr > 1, we obtain
I
¤
01 > I
¤
11 which is equivalent to f > 1:
That is impossible since f < 1. So the investment without information is higher than the
investment with information.
Second, we analyse the case in which the innovator has his prior belief equal to one (he
is very pessimistic). We obtain that E(µjl) = E(µjh) = E(µ) = µH and q = 1 ¡ f.
Condition (1) is written as
(1 ¡ f)r > 1:
Condition (2) is written as
µ
H <
((1 ¡ f)r ¡ 1)2µL
4(1 ¡ f)k ¹ CµH + (1 ¡ f)(r ¡ 1)2 which is equivalent to 4(1¡f)k ¹ Cµ
H+((1¡f)r
2¡1)f < 0:
Since (1 ¡ f)r > 1 implies that 4(1 ¡ f)k ¹ CµH + ((1 ¡ f)r2 ¡ 1)f > 0 then condition
(2) does not hold. So the innovator does not invest in research and he invests I¤
11 in the
project.
We compare I¤
01 and I¤
11. If (1 ¡ f)r · 1 then I¤
01 = 0 < I¤
11. And if (1 ¡ f)r > 1, we
obtain
I
¤
01 > I
¤
11 which is equivalent to ¡ f > 0:
That is impossible since f > 1
2. So the investment without information is higher than
the investment with information.
¥
Proof of Proposition 4
According to the Proposition 1, with the signal ¾ 2 fh;lg, the innovator continues his
project if I < r
kE(µj¾). We immediately note that r
kE(µj¾) is increasing with r and de-
creasing with k. So higher marginal revenue increases the range of values in which the
innovator continues his project and a higher cost parameter decreases it.
16We study how the marginal revenue and the cost parameter a®ect conditions (1) and (2).
We immediately note that qr is increasing with r. Then we di®erentiate the right hand
side of condition (2) with respect to r, we obtain
2(qr ¡ 1)qE(µ)[qk ¹ CE(µ) + (r ¡ 1)(1 ¡ q)]
[4qk ¹ CE(µ) + q(r ¡ 1)2]2
which is positive because r > 1
q and q < 1.
Thus, higher marginal revenue increases the range of values in which the innovator invests
in research.
Now, we note that condition (1) is not a®ected by k. Then we di®erentiate the right
hand side of condition (2) with respect to k. We obtain
¡4q ¹ C(qr ¡ 1)2E(µ)2
[4qk ¹ CE(µ) + q(r ¡ 1)2]2
which is negative because r > 1
q. Thus, a higher parameter cost decreases the range of
values in which the innovator invests in research.
¥
Proof of Proposition 5
We study how the cost of information acquisition a®ects conditions (1) and (2). We note
that condition (1) is not a®ected by ¹ C. We then di®erentiate the second equation of
condition (2) with respect to ¹ C. We obtain
¡4qkE(µ)2(qr ¡ 1)2
[4qk ¹ CE(µ) + q(r ¡ 1)2]2
which is negative because r > 1
q. Thus, a higher cost of information acquisition decreases
the range of values in which the innovator invests in research.
¥
Proof of Lemma 6
The innovator stops his project when he receives the signal h if I > r
kE(µjh) and he contin-
ues it when he receives the signal l if I < r
kE(µjl). We have
@E(µjh)
@f =
p0(1¡p0)(µH¡µL)
(1¡q)2 which
is positive and
@E(µjl)
@f =
p0(1¡p0)(µL¡µH)
q2 which is negative. So r
kE(µjh) is decreasing with
f and r
kE(µjl) is increasing with f. Thus, a higher precision of information increases the
range of values in which the innovator stops his project if he receives the signal h while
17if he receives the signal l, he continues it.
¥
Proof of Proposition 6
We study how the precision of information modi¯es conditions (1) and (2). We analyse
the case in which the precision of information is almost uninformative, i.e. f tends to-
wards 1
2. We obtain that q tends towards 1
2, E(µjl), E(µjh) and E(µ) tend to be equal.
Condition (1) may be written as r > 2. And condition (2) may be written as
E(µ) <
2(1
2r ¡ 1)2E(µ)
4k ¹ CE(µ) + (r ¡ 1)2 which is equivalent to 16kCE(µ) + (¡4 + 3r)r < 0
Since r > 2 implies that 16kCE(µ)+(¡4+3r)r > 0, condition (2) does not hold. Thus,
the innovator does not invest in research and he invests I11 in the project.
We compare I¤
01 and I¤
11. If r · 2 then I¤
01 = 0 < I¤
11. And if r > 2, we obtain
I
¤
01 > I
¤
11 which is equivalent to ¡
1
2
> 0:
That is impossible. So the investment without information is higher than the investment
with information.
We study how the precision of information modi¯es conditions (1) and (2). We di®eren-
tiate the left hand side of condition (1), we obtain r(1 ¡ 2p0) which is positive if p0 < 1
2
and if p0 ¸ 1
2, it is negative. We then di®erentiate the left hand side of condition (2), we
obtain
@E(µjl)
@f =
p0(1¡p0)(µL¡µH)
q2 which is negative. And we di®erentiate the right hand side of
condition (2) we obtain
(rq + 1)(rq ¡ 1)E(µ)(4k ¹ CE(µ) + (r ¡ 1)2)(1 ¡ 2p0)
[4qk ¹ CE(µ) + q(r ¡ 1)2]2 (6)
Since r > 1
q is positive, (6) is positive if p0 < 1
2 and if p0 ¸ 1
2, it is negative.
Overall if the innovator is optimistic, a higher precision of information increases the range
of value in which the innovator invests in research.
¥
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